Between July 2024 and June 2025, Nigeria’s kidnap-for-ransom epidemic hardened into a structured, profit-driven industry that now rivals legitimate business activities in scale.
According to SBM Intelligence, at least 4,722 people were abducted in 997 incidents across the country, with kidnappers demanding nearly ₦48 billion and receiving verified payments of ₦2.57 billion ($1.66 million). The report warns that ransom payments are not only draining household wealth but also weakening business confidence and stunting investment.
The crisis is increasingly shaped by Nigeria’s volatile currency environment. Despite a surge in ransom sums, naira depreciation means kidnappers earn less in dollar terms. For example, ₦653.7 million collected in 2022 equalled $1.13 million at prevailing rates, but the ₦2.57 billion obtained in the last year translates to only $1.66 million.
Criminal groups are now inflating ransom demands in naira to offset currency erosion, essentially mirroring corporate behaviour in a high-inflation economy.
The Northwest remains the most dangerous region for both residents and businesses, accounting for 42.6% of incidents and 62.2% of victims. Zamfara alone recorded over 1,200 victims, followed by Kaduna and Katsina.
The region’s combination of ungoverned rural territory and entrenched bandit syndicates allows for industrial-scale abductions. By contrast, the Southwest saw just 5.3% of incidents and 3% of victims, offering a relatively safe haven for investors, though the perception of national risk still weighs heavily on corporate decision-making.
Mass abductions, defined as incidents with more than five victims, made up nearly a quarter of all cases, overwhelmingly concentrated in the north. Villagers are increasingly forced into labour on bandit-controlled farms and mining sites, suggesting that kidnapping has expanded beyond ransom into broader economic exploitation.
Regional variations in ransom dynamics highlight the financial sophistication of kidnappers. In the South-South, one gang in Delta State demanded a staggering ₦30 billion, reflecting the oil-rich region’s exposure to high-value targets.
In the Northeast, ransom payments reached their peak, largely because ₦766 million, almost 30% of the national total, was reportedly paid for the release of Justice Haruna Mshelia, kidnapped by a Boko Haram-linked faction. Islamist insurgents are increasingly treating kidnapping as a revenue stream, with ransom proceeds funnelled into logistics and arms procurement.
Religious leaders remain frequent targets. At least 17 Catholic priests were abducted during the period, with ₦460 million demanded and ₦70 million paid. Although quick settlements may have reduced clergy fatalities, intermediaries face growing risks; some have been killed or kidnapped during ransom exchanges.
The broader economic consequences are far-reaching. Kidnapping exacerbates food inflation by disrupting agricultural output in rural areas, where farmers abandon fields or pay “taxes” to armed groups. Businesses in affected regions face higher costs from relocation, insurance, and security outlays. For small enterprises, the burden of hiring private guards or making informal payments often forces closure. Larger firms curtail expansion, particularly in high-risk industries like mining, logistics, and agribusiness.
For foreign investors, the data confirms long-standing fears: Nigeria’s insecurity problem is not only persistent but increasingly commercialised. The “ransom economy” competes directly with formal economic activity, redirecting billions of naira from household consumption and corporate investment into criminal networks. SBM Intelligence argues that this diverts liquidity away from the real economy while financing terrorism, further damaging Nigeria’s sovereign risk profile.
Public confidence in security forces continues to deteriorate. Roughly 68 per cent of Nigerians surveyed rate security performance poorly, leading to a proliferation of vigilante groups. While these groups provide localised relief, they complicate the security architecture and, in some cases, engage in their own extortion practices, creating further uncertainty for businesses.
The outlook is bleak without coordinated reforms. Unless the government disrupts ransom payment flows, strengthens rural governance, and stabilises the macroeconomy, kidnapping risks will become permanently institutionalised. Already, the line between organised crime and insurgency is blurring, with bandits and militants leveraging abduction proceeds to fund arms, recruit fighters, and control territory.
For businesses, the implications are clear: higher operational costs, restricted geographic reach, and increased risk premiums. For households, the consequence is an ever-present threat that diverts disposable income into survival strategies. And for Nigeria’s investment climate, the persistence of kidnapping as a lucrative parallel economy undermines both domestic and foreign investor confidence.
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